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Volume 15, Number 9 (March 5, 2009) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Crisis makes manifest fissures in Russia's political façade  
Despite the passage of one year since Dmitri Medvedev was elected president of 
the Russian Federation, the odd "tandem" that formed when former President 
Putin selected his successor and finagled to ensure his electoral victory, then 
sidled into the role of prime minister has yet to establish a clear mechanism of 
governance (institutional or personal) or to delineate, at least publicly, the rulers' 
respective spheres of authority.  The result is a muddle of divided responsibilities:  
Putin and his government clearly have overall authority in the economic sphere, 
but the attendant responsibility for economic missteps appears absent; President 
Medvedev seems to have authority in foreign affairs, as well as some judicial and 
legislative initiatives, but only absent crisis, such as attended the invasion of 
Georgia in August 2008.  
 
While the onset of crises (economic and political-military) seems to demand a 
more transparent method of governance, the experiences with the Georgian war 
and the economic crisis have provided starkly different results.  Last August, 
Prime Minister Putin took control of Russia's response in a very public and 
bellicose manner.  President Medvedev negotiated with the EU (through the 
French president) over ceasefire terms that were never fully implemented — at 
great peril to his reputation and with damage to his presumed authority (ex 
officio) in such matters. (1)  Prime Minister Putin emerged from August's events 
as the obvious senior member of the tandem, and the indispensable authority in 
the Russian political leadership. 
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The onset and continued tumble of economic crisis has produced a more mottled 
picture of leadership.  While the Russian government traditionally (at least since 
1992) has assumed both the lead and the responsibilities for economic reform 
and management, initial responses to the 2008 economic downturn, particularly 
by Russia's oligarchs, suggested uncertainty; those seeking the state's financial 
largesse appealed both to Putin and Medvedev for support.  However, it soon 
became clear that Putin's government would control the distribution of "bail out" 
funds and, additionally, structure (and restructure) corporate mergers and 
asset/debt trades.  (2) 
 
As the economic crisis grinds on, three trends are most notable and are coming 
to characterize this phase in relations between the president, prime minister, and 
their respective cadres.  First, President Medvedev appears to have stepped up 
efforts (however mild) to differentiate himself from his predecessor.  Most 
recently, Medvedev has indicated his support for two bills that appear to 
encourage the formation and representation of small political parties.  One bill 
aims to reduce the number of signatures required of a political party for 
registration, while the other seeks to address the current inequalities of media 
coverage, specifically television and radio, for all parties represented in the 
Duma. (3)  Putin, since accepting the leadership of, if not membership in, United 
Russia has made clear efforts to ensure the dominance of United Russia, and 
Medvedev's measures can be seen as attempts to counterbalance the party.  
 
These efforts on the part of Medvedev have fed into another aspect of the current 
situation that involves rampant speculation—of a sort rarely seen since the 
Yel'tsin years—over a possible shake-up in the current political arrangement.  (4) 
Several factors, including early indicators of independent action by the president, 
contribute to the speculation, but the effects of the economic crisis form the basis 
of most scenarios.  In part, this reflects the assumption that the prime minister 
and his government are responsible for "anti-crisis" measures that are not 
proving successful in resolving the economic difficulties.  While it is assumed that 
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Russia's banking system has survived thus far due, in large part, to government 
actions (specifically the Finance Minister's creation of a large reserve fund), 
future incarnations of the crisis likely will result in severe economic challenges 
and privations.  Prime Minister Putin, whose hallmark has been stability and 
order, must either prepare himself to oversee an era of economic distress (with 
its probable negative impact on his popularity) or leave his post.  It is the 
possibility of Putin's loss of public support in the face of this crisis that lies at the 
heart of the ouster/resignation scenarios.  What is more notable, perhaps, than 
the speculation itself is the realization of circumstances that make these 
scenarios seem possible.  
 
There is also a robust debate among several leading members of the apparat 
(alternatively Putin and Medvedev associates) regarding the nature of Russia's 
polity and the possibility of changes to the social and political structure.  Igor 
Yurgens of the Institute for Contemporary Development seems to have sparked 
the debate with his consideration of a social contract that involved a trade off 
between prosperity and citizens' rights. (5) Responses have abounded, perhaps 
most notably from Vladislav Surkov, who was considered Putin's main political 
adviser (and "architect" of youth group movement Nashi).  Surkov, who 
addressed "Forum Strategy 2020," a gathering meant for a discussion of the 
political situation and dedicated to reviewing Medvedev's first year as president, 
attacked suggestions that a social compact had developed in Russia during the 
Putin years:  "I mean speculation on how the powers-that-be distributed oil 
dividends and so on and society in return forsook its rights and freedoms.  And 
how now that oil dividends have been expended, society comes to its senses 
again and wants freedoms back."  "A word to the wise," Surkov offered to those 
swayed by this argument, "Try not to get carried away even in crises."  (6)  
 
If there are fissures developing in the political leadership, they are most 
noticeable within and between the government and presidential apparats.  While 
competition between the Kremlin and government staffs is not only to be 
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expected, but indeed has been a characteristic of every post-Soviet government, 
it is the factionalism re-emerging within each staff that is most suggestive of 
conflict.  At the Kremlin, the division seems to be a consequence of the 
ideological dispute over whether the nature of the political system needs to be 
changed (or is changing due to circumstances) or whether it is best to maintain 
the status quo.  Most recently, it has deepened over the selection (and 
publication) of a list of apparat benchwarmers – the Kremlin "reserves" that 
seems to have been a special project of Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergei Naryshkin.  
 
Within the government, nearly the same factional splits that were visible in Putin's 
Kremlin have reappeared, notably between siloviki and St. Petersburger 
economists.  In this case, circumstances evolving directly from the economic 
situation, such as a debate over propping up the ruble and at what expense to 
industry, have aligned Finance Ministry Chief Aleksei Kudrin, along with his 
recently-released deputy, Sergei Storchak, (7) Central Banker Sergei Ignatiev, 
Economic Development Minister Elvira Nabiullina, and very few others against an 
array of siloviki, including Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Russian Railways 
President Vladimir Yakunin, and Russian Technologies Chief Sergei Chemezov, 
et al.  
 
What is clear from events of the past year is that the diarchy appears as an 
unstable political arrangement, not least because of its hazily conceived division 
of authority.  The current economic upheaval has provided an environment that 
may serve either to anchor the diarchy by providing institutional roots and 
support, or to shred the delicate structure altogether.  There is support for both 
approaches.  As former Kremlin ideologue, Gleb Pavlovsky notes, "There is a 
multiparty system with the authorities…. One of those is the pro-crisis party, 
those who want a new little coup." (8) 
 
While Surkov may hope to prevent the crisis from distorting or destroying the 
system that he helped to create and therefore propounds a need to strengthen its 
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dynamic, there are those who suggest that the artificial creation of the tandem 
will topple on its own: "Surkov sees the situation he created over the last few 
years has started to come apart," claims Yevgeni Gontmakher from the Institute 
for Contemporary Development.  "We need to introduce real politics, not this 
imitation." (9) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) See ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV Number 15 (18 August 2008) for comments 
by then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice regarding Medvedev's (and 
Russia's) inability to deliver on their promises). 
(2) See previous ISCIP Analysts, e.g. Volume XV, Number 8 (19 February 2009). 
(3) "Medvedev Bills Promise To Help Political Parties," The Moscow Times, Issue 
4097, 4 Mar 09 via 
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/articles/detail.php?ID=375006&print=Y, accessed 5 
Mar 09. 
(4) See, for example, "Is Putin leaving," by Dmitri Bykov, Sobesednik, 26 Feb 09 
and "Coup rumors should not be dismissed," Interview with Pavel Gusev, editor-
in-chief of Moskovsky komsomolets, Moscow City FM Radio, 1230 GMT, 2 Mar 
09; BBC Monitoring via JRL, 4 Mar 09, 2009-#44. 
(5) See ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 8 (19 February 2009). 
(6) "We never traded freedom for lentil soup," by Anton Denisov, Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, No. 42, 3 Mar 09; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak's arrest on corruption charges and 
eventual release from detention last year is detailed in several previous ISCIP 
Analysts. 
(8) "Top Officials Denounce Calls for Kremlin to Restore Freedoms," by Gregory 
L. White, 4 Mar 09, Wall Street Journal via Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 4 Mar 
09, @009-#44.  
(9) Ibid. Quote attributed to Yevgeni Gontmakher, a senior staff member of Igor 
Yurgens' Institute for Contemporary Development. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
The financial crisis and Russia’s middle class 
Part of the difficulty of examining how Russia’s middle class has been affected by 
the current financial crisis is due to the difficulty of defining the term "middle 
class."  In unquantifiable terms, it could refer to those who are educated, occupy 
mid-level jobs with growth potential, and live comfortably on a steady income.  A 
2003 survey of the Russian population contextualized the term based on three 
factors: “wealth, occupation, and self-identification,” (1) and found that nearly 20 
percent of the Russian people self-selected into the middle class in at least two 
of these categories, a group that researchers named the “core middle class.” (2) 
Although the number was substantially higher in urban areas than in rural, this 
figure was the average for the entire country. 
 
Within five years of the original study, a group of Russian sociologists modified 
this definition, specifying that the middle class lived only in urban areas, added 
higher education to the requirements for inclusion, and classified their work as 
“non-manual or entrepreneurial.” (3) These changes raised the number of 
middle-class Russians to more than 25 percent of the population. Unless 
otherwise stated, this will be the working definition for all future references to the 
"middle class" in this article. 
 
In the meantime, Russia’s Ministry of Economy put forth its own definition in 
December 2004 when it announced that only those with earnings of more than 
“six times greater than the subsistence minimum” counted as part of the middle 
class. According to the same report, Russia’s middle class would include 50-60 
percent of the population by 2010, a very optimistic figure encouraged by the 
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previous four years of financial growth thanks to high oil and natural gas prices. 
(4) The current minimum wage in Russia is 2000 rubles ($55) per month, (5) 
which would mean that the middle class includes anyone who earns more than 
12000 rubles ($332) per month. Even though the optimism that fueled this 
prediction has faded in light of the current financial crisis, this definition would 
expand drastically the current middle-class population. 
 
Finally, a spring 2008 Levada poll of the middle class helped put this issue in 
more concrete terms, only focusing on those who earned more than 68,250 
rubles ($1888) per month in Moscow, and more than 36,400 rubles ($1,006) 
elsewhere. (6) 
 
The inability of pollsters, the government, and Russian citizens to agree on a 
single definition for "middle class" is less important than the universal factors that 
set the current Russian middle class apart from its counterparts in other 
developed economies.  First of all, in most developed countries, the middle class 
makes up the majority, not the minority.  Second, and more importantly, rampant 
corruption among the business community has created what some experts call a 
“shadow economy,” or an economy based on estimation.  A poll from 2000 found 
that most persons claimed to earn $600 per month on average, (well above the 
proffered minimum wage) but listed $450-1250 worth of expenses, which is an 
alarming disparity in light of most Russians’ lack of savings and credit. (7) 
 
This lack of savings and credit is the third major factor indicating why the global 
financial crisis is affecting the Russian middle class differently than both the 
Russian upper and lower classes, as well as the rest of the world’s middle-class 
population.  After the financial crisis of the 1990s, most of Russia's citizens never 
really regained trust in the country’s banking system. This is understandable; 
after all, it was the middle class that bore the brunt of the economic damage 
inflicted on and by the government in the 1990s: massive unemployment, food 
and supply shortages, bank collapses, and government-sponsored fundraising 
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schemes such as GKO bonds and other short-term, ruble-dominated treasury 
bills that promised high payoffs but failed to provide any financial compensation. 
In August 1998, despite the nearly $45 billion that the population had poured into 
the GKOs over four years, Russia defaulted on its debt and devalued the ruble, 
causing banks to fail and wiping out the savings of private citizens. (8) In the 
aftermath of the crash, the middle class virtually disappeared, as a majority of the 
country’s educated, mid-level white-collar employees lost their jobs, pensions, 
and savings. 
 
At that time, it was doubtful that the situation ever would improve, and many 
concluded that there was scant possibility of middle class expansion in the near 
future. (9) Soon, however, then-President Putin instituted a combination of 
financial and government reforms, which were bolstered by a soaring 
commodities-based economy that created ideal conditions for growth. For the 
next several years, Russia experienced, on average, seven percent annual 
growth, which served to eradicate foreign debt, dramatically lower poverty levels, 
create a budget surplus, multiply the average income by eight and allow the 
government to put away more than a half trillion dollars in foreign currency 
reserves, as well as create a $172 billion reserve fund. (10) Even after the onset 
of the global financial crisis, Russia’s economy ranked tenth in the world in 2008 
with a $1.8 trillion GDP. (11) 
 
Many assume that these factors will prevent the financial crisis from reaching the 
people in the same way that the 1998 collapse did. However, as mentioned 
before, the major reason why the current situation has not affected middle-class 
Russians seriously is that they simply never put their money back into the 
financial system. Instead, suspicious of the government when it comes to 
economic matters, nervous citizens choose to invest in short-term projects or 
squirrel away money at home or in foreign banks. 80 percent of Russian families 
currently have no savings. (12) 
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This mistrust extends beyond savings accounts to the nation’s credit system. 
While most westerners have high personal debt, few Russians have credit cards, 
and mortgages account for less than 1.5 percent of the country’s GDP. (13) In 
the eyes of some economists, what was once a problem to be overcome has 
now become an advantage, as a simple economy might prove to be more 
resilient and recover more quickly than western credit-burdened economies. 
 
At the same time, there are several factors that may complicate the recovery of 
the middle class.  First of all, unemployment continues to rise. As of last month, 
unemployment in Russia was at 5.8 million, an increase of 500,000 from Fall 
2008.  This number is roughly equivalent to eight percent of the population, an 
increase of 1.8 percent from the past year (14) and the first time since 2006 that 
unemployment has not decreased. (15) This trend is expected to continue into 
2009, as experts from Russia’s Health and Social Development Ministry have 
predicted that unemployment will approach seven million. In this context, the 
number of persons without savings is a serious liability. (16) 
 
Even those who do have money are affected by the falling value of the ruble. 
While members of the upper class are insulated by their wealth from short-term 
currency undulations, the middle class lives paycheck-to-paycheck, leaving its 
representatives more vulnerable to both rising unemployment and the variability 
of the ruble. Even though the government continues to prop up the national 
currency, the value has continued to decrease, which means that middle-class 
Russians, who deal only in cash, consistently are losing money as food and 
housing prices rise. In the past year, for example, food prices have increased 
between 36-50 percent, more than four times the increase in European Union 
countries. (17) 
 
The Kremlin response to the burgeoning middle-class crisis has been minimal.  
Perhaps remembering that it was the growing and vocal discontent among the 
newly expanded lower class that prompted President Yel'tsin to fire then-Prime 
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Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in March 1998, and then to hire and fire a series of 
Prime Ministers in succession until Putin took office, the Kremlin has gone out of 
its way to downplay the seriousness of the current situation and prevent the 
burden from landing on the middle class a second time. In November it publicly 
acknowledged the need to “move decisively to protect the emerging middle 
classes from poverty in the economic slowdown,” in order to quell fears about 
Russia’s long-term stability. (18) 
 
These words have yet to be bolstered by actions, however, and the trouble 
seems to be getting worse. In December, account holders at Capital Credit, a 
Moscow bank, found that their money was no longer available when they went to 
retrieve it.  In a show of public discontent that could grow ever more prevalent, 
investors turned to the internet to group together, contact politicians, and pass 
around petitions calling for the bank’s license to be revoked, which would qualify 
the bank’s clients for government insurance and entitle them to a return of their 
funds. When this failed to garner a response from Russia’s Central Bank, 
investors took to the streets in protest, waving signs that compared the current 
situation to the 1998 crisis.  After several weeks, the government eventually 
revoked the bank’s license. (19) 
 
This example, particularly the protestors’ willingness to compare the current 
situation to the 1998 crisis, is telling, especially since Putin often claimed during 
his presidency that the strong economic growth he oversaw during his eight 
years in power was the result of Kremlin-instituted economic and social reform 
and constituted a victory over the corruption and incompetence that had caused 
the 1998 collapse. Stability, he often maintained, was what restored Russia’s 
position in the world. It remains to be seen whether the government will be able 
to maintain that stability as the situation continues. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) Faith Hillis, “Russian Middle Class,” Carnegie Involvement for International 
Peace, 9 Apr 03 via 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=599&prog=zgp&p
roj=znpp. Last accessed 28 Feb 09. 
(2) Ibid.  
(3) Anna Kizilova, “Russian Middle Class – Sociologists’ View,” Russia-Info 
Centre, 8 Aug 08 via 
http://www.russia-ic.com/education_science/science/science_overview/798/. Last 
accessed 28 Feb 09. 
(4) “Russia to have middle class by 2010,” Gateway to Russia, 14 Dec 04 via 
http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_260046.php.  Last accessed 28 Feb 09. 
(5) “Minimum Wage to Raise in Russia Next Year,” Kommersant, 11 Dec 06 via 
http://www.kommersant.com/p729126/r_528/mrot_minimum_wage/.  Last 
accessed 28 Feb 09. 
(6) Conor Sweeney, “Russia's middle class fears "apocalypse": poll,” Reuters, 3 
Jul 08 via http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0317720620080703. 
Last accessed 28 Feb 09. 
(7) Josh Wilson, “Russia's Elusive Middle Class,” The School of Russian and 
Asian Studies, 10 Feb 04 via http://www.sras.org/russian_middle_class.  Last 
accessed 28 Feb 09 
(8) Meier, Andrew, “Memo to Shirley Jones,” Frontline: The Crash - The Russian 
Market, 02 February 1999 via 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crash/etc/russia.html. Last 
accessed 28 Feb 2009. 
(9) “Russian Middle Class – Sociologists’ View,” ibid. 
(10) Philip P. Pan, “Financial Crisis In Russia Raises Stakes for Putin,” 
Washington Post, 21 Sep 08 via http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/20/AR2008092001858.html.  Last accessed 28 Feb 
09. 
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(11) Stephen Kotkin, “How Did Russia Rebuild Itself? Sorry, But You're Wrong,” 
History News Network, 26 Jan 09 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 26 Feb 09, 
2009-#17. 
(12) Chloe Arnold, “Russia's Middle Class Feeling Pinch as Unemployment 
Soars,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 5 Feb 09 via 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russias_Middle_Classes_Feeling_Pinch_As_Unemp
loyment_Soars/1380032.html.  Last accessed 28 Feb 09. 
(13) Ibid.  
(14)  “Russia - Unemployment Rate,” CIA World Factbook, 24 Feb 09 via 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html#Econ. 
Last accessed 28 Feb 09. 
(15) “Russia Unemployment Rate,” Index Mundi, November 2007 via 
http://www.indexmundi.com/russia/unemployment_rate.html. Last accessed 28 
Feb 09. 
(16) “Russia’s Middle Class Feeling Pinch as Unemployment Soars,” ibid.  
(17) “How Did Russia Rebuild Itself? Sorry, But You’re Wrong,” ibid.  
(18) Faulconbridge, Guy, "Kremlin says to defend Russian middle class in crisis,” 
Thomson Financial News/Reuters, 28 Nov 08 via 
http://www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2008/11/28/afx5755046.html.  
Last accessed 28 Feb 08. 
(19) Clifford J. Levy, “A bank without money disillusions Russia's new middle 
class,” International Herald Tribune, 29 Dec 08 via 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/12/29/europe/29russia.php. Last accessed 28 
Feb 09. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
MVD – Targeting students 
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On 14th February, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Mikhail Sukhodolskiy 
announced that the MVD is launching a new surveillance program targeted at 
Russia’s education system. “Educators”—a euphemism for surveillance 
officers—are to be assigned to universities around the country in the very near 
future.  The reasons cited for this decision are two-fold. First, Sukhodolskiy 
claims that authorities are concerned particularly about the failure of “ethnic 
youths” (presumably Chechens, Tatars, Bashkirs, etc.) to “assimilate and to 
adhere to common standards of behavior.” Secondly, the political leadership 
fears that the current political and economic instability might lead to a Russian 
version of the protests that occurred in Paris during 1968. (1) Russia’s youth, 
according to Sukhodolskiy, has been left out of “indoctrinal work” for too long, a 
fact that might lead to “outbursts of social activism,” read anti-government 
outpourings. (2) 
 
There is no reason to doubt that President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin fear mass demonstrations in the current climate – Russia’s 
economy has suffered and will continue to suffer. New graduates likely will face 
extreme difficulty in finding work, and the unemployment rate will rise, just as it 
has done elsewhere. But, the sales pitch behind the program is transparent and 
cynical at best. Russia has a huge problem with racism and discrimination 
against ethnic minorities – witness the knee jerk response of blaming even the 
smallest problems on Chechens or other minorities from the Caucasus. This is a 
blatant case of using fear of the “other” to convince 7.5% of the population 
(Russia’s students) that the state must monitor their every word, in order to 
protect them. 
 
FSB & finance 
Late in January it became clear just how seriously President Medvedev is taking 
the current economic situation. At a meeting attended by the country’s most 
powerful officials, Medvedev assigned the FSB the task of monitoring the 
expenditure of state funds. Corruption already is a huge problem in Russia, and 
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the Kremlin is concerned that the “considerable resources” that will be called 
upon to solve the financial emergency “should be spent as designated.” 
Medvedev’s comments at the meeting were relatively tough, with the president 
making it clear that any attempts to “profiteer” from the crisis would be viewed as 
a “double crime.” (3) The national economy Medvedev noted, already contains a 
number of “corrupt set-ups,” which could cause serious damage if they were 
allowed to function freely. (4) 
 
In total, the FSB will be supervising the allocation and distribution of some 2.1 
trillion rubles. (5) It is evident that the Kremlin (with some justification) is 
concerned about the issue—epitomized by the oligarchs—of capital flight, which 
so nearly brought about a collapse during the Yel’tsin years. Russia’s economic 
future depends on ensuring that its valuable oil and gas revenues do not 
disappear offshore. 
 
Further expansion of the FSB’s power generally must be viewed with concern, 
given the agency’s already wide-ranging reach. In this instance, however, it is 
difficult to see who else could be called upon to do the job: the country’s financial 
regulators clearly are not trusted at the highest levels. 
 
Politkovskaya fallout 
On 17th February, the jury in the Politkovskaya trial returned with a unanimous 
not guilty verdict for all of the defendants accused in the murder-conspiracy. Any 
other decision had been made almost impossible due to a number of factors. 
DNA and fingerprint evidence at the scene did not match those of the 
defendants, while prosecutors and investigators had succeeded in losing—
apparently irretrievably—a number of other pieces of evidence. (6) 
 
The fall-out from the verdict was immediate and virulent. State attorneys 
announced their intention to file an appeal, while the Prosecutor General’s Office 
insisted that the truth of the crime would be “fully established” by further 
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investigation, so that “those who carried it out and those who commissioned it” 
could be “identified” and brought to justice. (7) Russia’s Human Rights 
Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin also issued a statement noting that the investigation 
had been carried out in a shoddy manner, with little or no regard to the process 
itself. The focus of inquiries, according to Lukin, is too often on “the opinion of the 
bosses as to which verdict is required in a given case,” rather than on correct 
methods and procedures. (8) 
 
Anna Politkovskaya’s son Ilya reacted to the verdict with disappointment, 
claiming that “having studied the case files,” he was convinced that the four 
defendants “were involved in the murder one way or another.” (9) Mr. 
Politkovskaya did not blame the jury, claiming instead that the prosecution’s 
affidavits had been “half-baked,” and should not have been submitted in the form 
that they were. (10) Politkovskaya’s former deputy editor at Novaya gazeta, (11) 
as well as a number of human rights activists echoed these sentiments, implying 
that the Security Services had omitted key pieces of evidence, including forged 
identity documents, computer hard-drives, SIM cards and surveillance video 
footage, despite concerns that they would be painted as incompetent, for fear of 
revealing classified information in an open court (12), and for fear of revealing 
who really was “behind” the murder. (13) Neither Mr. Politkovskaya nor his 
family’s attorneys believe any one of the four defendants was the actual 
triggerman. They argue that the “executor” and the “contractor” of the crime are 
still at large, (14) and have hinted that the investigation should focus on loyalist 
Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and those close to him. (15) 
 
Defense attorneys in the case have admitted that there is a likelihood that the 
jury’s verdict will be overturned, noting that such a ruling would fit the State’s 
pattern in high-profile cases. If that occurs, then the State and the Security 
Services will be able to claim—albeit illegitimately—that their work is done and 
that the case was solved. It is entirely possible, given Politkovskaya’s criticism of 
his regime, that President Kadyrov is connected to the murder. However, it is 
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simply not in the Kremlin’s interests to investigate the case—or any Kadyrov 
links—in any depth.  Perhaps it is for this reason that Ms. Politkovskaya’s family 
is disappointed with the verdict – they know that this trial is their only chance for 
any kind of closure. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Police To Be Assigned To Campus Duty At Russian Universities, Editorial: 
‘Calm Down, Student,’” Gazeta.ru, 14 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World 
News Connection. 
(2) Ibid.  
(3) “FSB Should Track Spending Of Govt Aid Allotted To Banks, Companies—
Medvedev,” Interfax, 29 Jan 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection.  
(4)“Russia’s FSB To Monitor Use Of State Anti-Crisis Funds,” Politkom.ru, 18 
Feb 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5)“Russia’s FSB To Monitor Expenditure of State Anti-Crisis Funds, Corrected 
Version; Changing Typo in Subslug. Article by Olga Mefodyeva: ‘Application Also 
Found For FSB,’” Politkom.ru, 13 Feb 09; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection.  
(6) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 8 (19 Feb 09).  
(7) “Politkovskaya Murder To be Fully Investigated—Official,” ITAR-TASS News 
Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 24 Feb 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(8) “Russian Ombudsman Slams Investigation Over Politkovskaya Murder Case,” 
Ekho Moskvy Radio, Moscow, in Russian, 19 Feb 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis.  
(9) “Murdered Russian Journalist’s Son Disappointed At Not Guilty Verdict,” Vesti 
TV, 19 Feb 09; OSC Summary via World News Connection. 
(10) “Politkovskaya’s Son Believes Acquitted Men Guilty of His Mother’s Death,” 
ITAR-TASS, 19 Feb 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
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(11) “Journalist Murder Trial: Politkovskaya: The Hunt For Justice Goes On: 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Erik Rundquist 
 
Russian military reform - a continuing saga 
Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov’s reforms of the Russian military continue to 
grab headlines.  While the most controversial and visible element of the reform is 
the reduction of military manpower (particularly among officers and the General 
Staff), a key component in bolstering these changes resides with Russia’s 
military industry. (1) That industry not only is critical in research, development, 
and military construction, but also in providing Russia with a source of revenue to 
help cover the costs associated with reform.  In addition, some recent measures 
concerning combat service support (essential to maintaining morale and 
effectiveness) may have implications for medical services and rear area support 
for combat brigades.  With the engines of reform turning will Serdyukov’s efforts 
stall in the midst of global economic crisis? 
 
The industrial “complex” 
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For the Russian navy, military reforms have focused on new ships and advanced 
weaponry to enhance force projection and strike capability.  With regard to 
precision long-range strike operations, tests are scheduled to resume on the 
Bulava missile system, despite its most recent flight failure in December 2008.  A 
Russian defense industry source noted, “Investigations which were carried out 
show that factory defects were the cause of the latest failed launch.” (2)  While at 
least five tests are scheduled for 2009, the sea-launched ballistic missile has not 
fared well, due to substandard construction or poor quality of the missile’s 
components. (3) 
 
Regarding force projection, the Russian navy announced it plans to receive its 
newest combat logistics ship, the Zvezdochka, sometime during the autumn of 
2009.  This construction project was started in September 2004, the ship was 
floated in December 2007, and according to the program’s director-general, 
Vladimir Nikitin, the ship recently has entered the “testing stage.” (4) If 
successfully tested, this logistical support ship may aid future Russian naval 
forays such as those seen in the Mediterranean and the Caribbean in 2008. 
 
While both the Bulava missile and logistical ship construction represent important 
tasks to support the navy, Russian Industry and Trade Minister Viktor Khristenko 
is examining the larger strategic picture for naval construction. Recently he 
announced a merger of Russian companies into a shipbuilding corporation will 
include the Rubin, Malakhit, and Almaz central design bureaus and three 
shipbuilding centers. (5)  Khristenko acknowledged that Russia’s 168 major 
shipbuilding companies, 2,000 minor component companies, and over 100 
private ship repairing companies employ over 160,000 persons and the purpose 
of this unified corporation will be to, “improve the competitiveness of the 
shipbuilding industry.” (6) While not necessarily a “bailout” moment for the 
Russian naval industrial complex, it seems Khristenko’s consolidation strategy, 
while attentive to the external global competition for naval sales, potentially could 
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create downsizing conditions where redundant functions within each currently 
independent company would be eliminated. 
 
Like their naval counterparts, the aviation and space components of Russian 
military production also are planning significant activities for 2009.  While there is 
anticipation of the initial test flight of Russia’s fifth generation fighter in mid-2009, 
the Russian Air Force will continue to receive current operational aircraft for its 
inventory. (7)  According to Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Drik, aide to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, at least ten MiG-29 SMT fighters 
and ten modernized Su-25 ground attack aircraft will be added to the Russian 
inventory this year. (8) 
 
Moreover, the Russian satellite navigation system “GLONASS” is expected to 
reach the operational parameters of its American counterpart “GPS” by the end 
of 2011, predicts Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov. (9) Despite this, 
Ivanov adds that there is heavy competition with the European Union and China 
where Russia might, “ ... lose our leading positions as a provider of navigation 
services.” (10)  Ironically, Ivanov’s statement was made in the midst of a 
maintenance stand-down where three of twenty satellites were taken off-line 
simultaneously, which “considerably reduced” the availability of navigation 
services, highlighting the instability of Russia’s satellite system. (11) 
 
While Russia is trying to procure advanced weapon systems, Serdyukov 
announced in a closed session of the State Duma that the military budget would 
be changed.  In fact, Russia’s revised defense budget for 2009 actually will cut 
defense spending by 15 percent, although there is no limit on military hardware 
and equipment “purchased via state orders.” (12)  As if trying to calm the Russian 
arms manufacturers, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin noted that the domestic 
defense industry will have production orders for several years.  He signed and 
authorized an order providing government loan guarantees for “strategic military 
industrial concerns.” (13) 
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Another way the Russian defense industry can help itself is in the form of military 
exports, although the results are often mixed.  Nikolai Dimidyuk, a spokesman for 
Rosoboronexport, noted that there are over 20 billion dollars in current orders 
with nearly half of this total slated for combat aircraft and the remaining amount 
supporting ground forces, air defense, and naval forces. Rosoboronexport noted 
that its primary customers are China and India. (14)  In fact, the Indian 
Government Security Committee recently approved nearly 1.2 billion dollars to 
purchase 80 Russian Mi-17 medium transport helicopters for India’s air force. 
(15) 
 
Dimidyuk acknowledged that the global economic crisis has forced 
Rosoboronexport to examine other options to entice buyers.  In particular, this 
company may form joint ventures with other countries to share the burdens of 
research and development, and Dimidyuk remarked his company would, “... 
consider any forms of financial settlements.” (16) 
 
Another option for Russia to build up its financial coffers is through a military 
equipment leasing program.  In January 2009, the Director of Federal Service for 
Military-Technical Cooperation Mikhail Dmitriyev announced Russia may transfer 
several Project 971 Shchuka-B-Class (NATO designation: Akula-2) nuclear 
submarines to India for a ten-year lease period. (17) 
 
Despite these promising ventures and export options for the Russian military 
industrial complex, there have been some setbacks in the midst of Serdyukov’s 
reforms.  Algeria recently sent the Russian Air Force packing as it rejected their 
MiG-29 fighter aircraft imports after nearly three years of trying to close a 1.3 
billion dollar arms deal.  The Algerians cited the “inferior quality” of the fighters 
and highlighted an even greater symptom of Russian military sales; namely cost 
overruns, inability to meet delivery timelines, poor production, faulty equipment, 
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unreliable maintenance support, and lack of spare parts and replacement 
components. (18) 
 
Domestically, Serdyukov has had to intervene personally in order to take care of 
Russian military industrial workers.  Recently, the Defense Ministry promised to 
pay over four hundred workers of its 111th military factory in Briansk, as these 
technicians had not been paid their salaries for nearly seven months.  Attention 
to the matter apparently was highlighted when 18 workers went on a hunger 
strike in January 2009, resulting in two of the workers being hospitalized.  This 
particular factory also had failed to pay government taxes, fees, and energy bills 
and the factory leadership is under investigation. (19) While this factory might not 
be typical of the military production industry, it does serve to demonstrate the 
potentially corrupt domestic environment that Serdyukov must navigate in order 
to move forward with his military reform. 
 
Combat service support reform 
An important element of Russia’s planned military reform involves the various 
combat service support agencies for the military.  In particular, if smaller 
regionally-focused and agile combat brigades represent the army’s end goal, 
then care and morale of this diminished force is crucial.  Lieutenant General 
Vladimir Shappo, chief of the Russian Defense Ministry Main Medical 
Department, announced that nearly 2,200 medical officer positions will be cut, 22 
military hospitals would be closed, and some facilities merged, in order to support 
Serdyukov’s reforms.  Shappo suggests that despite these cuts, the quality in 
military care will be “gradually increasing.” (20)  By 2016, Shappo adds, 
approximately one-third of the military medical officers will be civilians and in 
many cases military doctors will likely “... remove their epaulettes and will remain 
in their hospitals.” (21)  This paradox of force downsizing coupled with 
transforming positions into civil service jobs resembles the General Staff cuts, 
where senior officers will remain in a civilian/advisory capacity. (22)  In either 
case, the retention of these officers in all likelihood will cut into any savings that 
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might have been reaped from their dismissal. Added to this, as civilian 
employees, Russian military officers may lose some flexibility regarding their 
deployment and tactical use. It is highly unlikely these specialists would be 
deployed to hostile areas. 
 
Closer to the combat brigade frontlines is the crucial “rear area,” which typically 
houses medical, supply, transportation, engineering, force protection, fuels, and 
other elements essential to maintaining combat forces.  Recently, the Rear 
Services Chief, Deputy Defense Minister Colonel-General Dmitri Bulgakov 
announced that a major reorganization and restructuring of the rear services 
would commence.  Bulgakov identified the global economic crisis as a factor in 
this decision, given that the reform is intended to be a cost-saving measure. (23) 
 
As if on cue, military analysts have pounced on the rear services reform effort. 
Anatoliy Tsyganok from the Military Forecast Center notes Serdyukov’s reform 
will severely degrade the rear service support structure.  Moreover, Tsyganok is 
advocating the division structure used by NATO, the US, and Japan that enables 
a more robust rear service support capability. (24)  Linking some of the 
highlighted problems within the Russian civilian economy, Tsyganok also claims 
that transforming the Armed Forces Rear Services into various civilian 
organizations and holding companies will make things worse for the military and 
“engender corruption.” (25) 
 
Konstantin Sivkov of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems is concerned that the 
reform measures will not provide any cost-savings at all.  He argues that transfer 
to civilian organizational support is more expensive and has increased “14 
times.”  He also feels that the civilian organization will be incapable of providing 
supply trains beyond three to four days of operations.  More importantly, he 
claims, “These civilian rear services specialists will scatter after the first shot.” 
(26) 
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As Defense Minister Serdyukov pushes through the reform measures that will 
impact the combat brigades, their combat service support functions, and the 
economic industrial base to bolster these changes, history unfortunately is not on 
Serdyukov’s side. Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, president of the Academy of 
Geopolitical Problems notes, “I have counted six phases of military reform in 
Russia beginning since 1988. Only one issue – reductions – has been 
successfully resolved in each of them.” (27)  In order to work through the reform 
measures, the military industrial complex will have to step up and compensate for 
the troop reduction by following through on its promises of adopting more 
advanced technology.  Serdyukov has much riding on this premise for 2009. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Shaun Barnes 
 
As signs of a NATO-Russian rapprochement continue, the new partners 
object 
On February 7th at the forty-fifth annual Munich Security Conference, speaker 
after speaker called for a renewed partnership between Russia and the West.  
US Vice President Joseph Biden notably declared that it was time to “push the 
reset button” on US-Russia relations and stated that his country’s European 
ballistic missile defense project would continue “in consultation with our NATO 
allies and Russia.” (1)  France’s president, Nicholas Sarkozy, who aims to bring 
his country back into full NATO membership, declared “I don’t believe today’s 
Russia is a military threat to the European Union or NATO.” (2)  Both Germany’s 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and Britain’s Foreign Secretary David Miliband 
endorsed the idea of a new dialogue on European security with Russia as a key 
partner. (3)  
 
The outpouring of support for a new Western dialogue with Russia was well-
received in Moscow after last year’s August rupture over Russia’s thrust into 
Georgia, which froze the activity of the NATO-Russia Council.  Russia’s NATO 
envoy, Dimitri Rogozin, welcomed Biden’s remarks on missile defense, hoping 
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Washington’s “new approach” on the issue would “lay a good foundation for talks 
at the level of the two presidents,” Obama and Medvedev. (4)  He also praised 
Sarkozy’s speech, calling the French president a “lucky one” and noting the 
impression his address made on the audience. (5)  The rhetorical olive branch 
extended at Munich lent credence to Rogozin’s repeated emphasis that NATO’s 
leadership is making the effort to restore relations between the West and Russia 
“[a]t their initiative,” not Russia’s. (6) 
 
Not all the participants at Munich were as ready as the representatives of the 
major Western countries to renew NATO ties to Russia.  For his part, NATO’s 
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer claimed it was an important goal, but 
added the reservation that the partnership “must be a two way street” with 
compromise from Moscow on Georgia, NATO expansion, and the war in 
Afghanistan. (7)  Estonia’s president delivered a speech tinged with tough 
rhetoric for Russia, ultimately concluding that NATO must return to its “core 
mission […] the defense of the alliance,” before exploring new pan-European 
security structures. (8) 
 
Most significant, however, were the skeptical remarks of Polish Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk.  Tusk cautioned that the US and NATO “must ask questions about 
Russia” before reengaging “without fear prejudice, aggression, but also without 
gullibility.”  He hinted that if European solidarity could break down during a crisis 
like the recent gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine, there could be little 
expectation of a united European front in the event of a “much serious (sic), or 
hotter, emergency situation.” (9)  
 
Tusk’s Munich speech was the most significant of a series of recent Polish 
warnings against too eager an embrace of Russia by NATO.  It is clear that 
Poland hopes to makes its influence felt at the upcoming 60th Anniversary NATO 
summit in Strasbourg-Kehl this April – a meeting that promises to be a turning 
point for the alliance as it plans to craft a new security concept and make a 
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formal decision on reestablishing the mechanisms for consultation with Russia.  
Poland’s Defense Minister Bogdan Klich wants the summit to “change the 
formula” for NATO’s cooperation with Moscow, to take account for the “lack of 
trust” between the two. (10)  Radoslaw Sikorski, Klich’s counterpart at the 
Foreign Ministry, suggested a “two-way strategy” for NATO that would not 
abandon dialogue with Russia, but would also stand strongly behind the 
alliance’s principles in situations like Russia’s war on Georgia. (11) 
 
Poland’s motives for this strong stance emanate, in part, from its historically chilly 
disposition toward Moscow, but also include concerns that it may lose the 
benefits of its deal with the US on missile defense.  Although Poland has 
received assurances that the ABM program would proceed as planned, the more 
reserved tone of the Obama administration on missile defense has caused 
concern that the plan will be used as a bargaining chip to secure Russian 
cooperation with the West, leaving Poland without the Patriot missile air defense 
system and military modernization funds it was promised in returned for hosting 
America’s ABM interceptors. (12) 
 
Moscow’s leaders have recognized that Poland and other relatively new 
members of NATO are “frightened” by the prospect of a resurgent Russia and 
that allegedly they have taken steps aimed at “blocking many Russian 
approaches to international issues.” (13)  However, Moscow has not deemed it 
necessary to address this challenge in any meaningful way, perhaps believing 
that the smaller NATO members will not carry the institutional weight to block the 
renewal of the NATO-Russia Council.  Instead, Russia has offered little more 
than kind words, the possibility of renewed compliance with the Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and a halt to the deployment of as yet 
nonexistent Iskander missiles to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. (14)  
Russia’s negotiation on the transit of NATO supplies to Afghanistan might have 
seemed a more significant gesture toward the West, had it not been 
accompanied by Moscow’s maneuvering to secure the closure of the America’s 
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air base at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan [See the ISCIP Analyst Volume XV 
Number 7 (5 February 2009)]. 
 
It does appear unlikely that movement on the resumption of the NATO-Russia 
Council will be blocked at the alliance’s summit next month.  Poland and the 
Baltic countries may well be out-muscled by the Western heavyweights.  
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Energy to the East 
Two events transpired in the month of February that, together, may signal a sea 
change in Russia’s energy export regime. On the 17th of the month, China 
secured a 20-year commitment of Siberian crude oil deliveries through a huge 
loans-for-oil deal with Moscow, and on the 18th of the month, Russia inaugurated 
its first LNG (liquefied natural gas) plant on Sakhalin Island in the Sea of 
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Okhotsk, pledging its first delivery to Japan in March. With the oil and gas 
agreements in place, Russia is poised to enter the East Asian market at a time 
when its traditional energy partners in the West sink deeper into recession. 
 
On 17 February, Beijing announced that the China Development Bank would 
lend Russian state oil company Rosneft and pipeline monopoly Transneft $25 
billion in exchange for a 20-year commitment to deliver crude oil to China.  (1) 
Under the loans-for-oil arrangement, Rosneft will supply 110 million barrels of oil 
annually, and Transneft will build a new spur of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean 
(ESPO) pipeline to transport those volumes to China.  (2) Russian Deputy Prime 
Minister Igor Sechin hailed the deal as a “breakthrough,” and noted that “$25 
billion is a unique deal in the history of the global economy.” (3) The magnitude 
of the loan is an unmistakable sign of the preeminent stature of China as a global 
lender flush with cash reserves. (4) Less obviously, it is also an indicator of the 
massive resistance with which China was forced to contend in its efforts to 
secure oil deliveries from its reluctant neighbor. (5) 
 
Beijing has been lobbying Moscow for Siberian oil deliveries for over a decade. A 
breakthrough that seemed imminent in 2004 when Russian oil giant Yukos 
advocated a privately financed pipeline to China collapsed mid-year with the 
arrest of Yukos chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky on charges of tax evasion. In years 
since, Moscow has delayed decision on a state-built pipeline to China several 
times. Although Russia began construction of the ESPO oil pipeline in 2006, the 
creeping rate of progress has evinced a deep skepticism in Moscow toward 
Chinese markets. (6) At a Sino-Russian summit in 2007, China’s energy chief, 
National Development and Reform Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Guobao, 
complained that “the Sino-Russian pipeline question is one step forward and two 
steps back . . . One moment Russia is saying they have made a decision, the 
next saying that no decision has been made.” (7) Analysts attribute Moscow’s 
ambivalence to several factors, including: stagnant Siberian oil production; 
unwillingness to alienate energy customers in the West; an ongoing campaign to 
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limit foreign control over Russian energy assets, and a profound discomfort with 
the notion that Russia may, in the near future, become China’s petrovassal. (8) 
 
Nevertheless, faced with declining demand for energy on global markets and 
stagnant crude oil production at home, Moscow has turned to Beijing with a new 
esprit de corps. China Development Bank obliged with $25 billion in loans at 
generous sub-market interest rates that will fluctuate between 5 and 5.5 percent. 
(9) Rosneft has not disclosed the price that China will pay for Russian oil, but 
analysts forecast an average of $73 per barrel, a robust figure compared with the 
current price of $39 per barrel of Russian crude. (10) The deal provides Rosneft 
with a cash infusion that will allow the company to manage its $21 billion debt 
load as it expands into remote oil fields in Eastern Siberia. Rosneft’s plan to tap 
the relatively undeveloped eastern fields will raise Russia’s flagging crude 
production, which fell in 2008 for the first time in a decade, at the same time that 
it will give China exclusive access to a new source of energy. (11) The key to a 
long-term supply relationship is a fixed permanent pipeline that connects Russian 
oil fields directly to China. China’s $10 billion loan to Transneft for the 
construction of the ESPO pipeline will finance the link that finally secures 
Moscow’s commitment to the Chinese market. (12) 
 
Equally important to the eastward shift in Russian energy exports, on 18 
February Russia launched its first LNG facility on Sakhalin Island. (13) Located 
100 miles north of Japanese Hokkaido, Sakhalin was seized by the Soviet Union 
at the end of WWII, together with four islands known in Russia as the Kurils. Both 
Russia and Japan continue to claim sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, a dispute 
that has forestalled the signing of a peace treaty ending hostilities after WWII. 
Their longstanding territorial contentions did not prevent Japanese Prime Minister 
Taro Aso from attending the inaugural ceremony at the Prigorodnoye gas 
liquefaction plant, where, as a guest of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, he 
discussed expanding energy cooperation between the two counties. (14) "Having 
such an energy source was our dream for many years," Aso said. "Russia is 
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becoming a constructive partner in this region. Japan welcomes Russia in this 
capacity." (15) 
 
Until now, Russia had to rely on pipelines to transport its natural gas to markets 
overland. Once compressed into a liquid state, however, gas volumes can be 
loaded onto tankers like crude oil and shipped anywhere in the world. When it 
achieves full capacity, the Sakhalin plant is expected to produce 5 percent of the 
global LNG supply annually, 65 percent of which is contracted for export to 
Japan, the world’s largest importer of LNG. Sakhalin exports, scheduled to begin 
in March, are expected to make up about 7 percent of Japan’s LNG imports 
annually. (16) Produced off the coast of Sakhalin and piped to the plant, the gas 
will eventually account for 8 percent of Japan's consumption. 
 
Russia’s energy ties with Japan seem to be easing the two countries’ diplomatic 
relationship somewhat, as Aso’s presence at the unveiling of Prigorodnoye 
attests. On the sidelines of the ceremony, Medvedev reiterated Russia’s 1956 
offer to return two of the Kuril Islands to Japan as part of a “creative approach” to 
the territorial dispute. (17) In the meantime, Russia is content to focus on its 
expanding share of the global energy market: "All this, beyond any doubt, 
strengthens our position, the position of Russia, as the biggest player on the 
energy market," said Medvedev. (18) 
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Russian Federation: Special Feature: Russia and Iran 
By Blake Brunner 
 
Relations between equals? 
Prime Minister Erdogan: Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I don't 
think I will come back to Davos after this. (1) 
 
During the Davos World Economic Forum, at the conclusion of a January 29 
panel including Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Arab League 
Secretary-General Amr Moussa, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Israeli 
President Shimon Peres, Erdogan took control of the floor, despite objections 
from the moderator, denounced what he described as an inappropriate 25-minute 
filibuster by Peres, and stalked off the stage.  The topic, of course, had been 
Israel’s recently concluded attack on the Gaza Strip, which Erdogan denounced 
as barbaric (he later also denounced anti-Semitism as a “crime against 
humanity”). (2) 
 
International media outlets seized on the episode and issued a deluge of 
editorials in which Erdogan’s Davos tirade was described as a crucial turn in 
Turkish foreign policy.  Despite the flag-waving crowd of supposed patriots who 
welcomed Erdogan home after his premature departure from Davos, opinion in 
the Turkish press was not unanimous.  While an Istanbul-based writer for the 
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International Herald Tribune wrote that Erdogan’s outburst signaled a “neo-
Ottoman awakening,” and concluded that “some things are changing in Turkey … 
for good,” (3)  on the other hand, a columnist for Turkey’s Hurriyet Daily News 
cautioned that “neither Israel nor Turkey could run the risk” of “spoil[ing] their 
relationship.” (4) 
 
Similar warnings appeared in Israeli and US media.  An unnamed Israeli official 
told Haaretz, "One does not risk the foreign policy of a country that claims to be a 
regional power for the sake of local elections," attributing Erdogan’s motivations 
to simple electioneering for Turkey’s upcoming electoral contests. (5)  And in one 
of the most recent and high-profile editorials from the United States, David L. 
Phillips, director of the Turkey Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the United 
States, shifted the focus from Erdogan to Turkey itself, stressing that “Turkey 
must repair its ties with Israel. … Turkey’s future lies with the West.  The Islamist 
street leads away from Europe to the Middle East.” (6) 
 
And this is where Russia comes in.  The opportunities provided by Turkish-
Russian cooperation prove that Turkey’s choice is not limited to either the West 
(i.e., the United States and Western Europe) or the Middle East.  Because of its 
strategic location and unique cultural history, Turkey’s options appear to be much 
more varied than portrayed by Phillips.  By cooperating with Russia and thus 
evading the West-versus-Middle East paradigm, Turkey opens up avenues to 
commerce, development and diplomacy that may never have existed had it relied 
only upon the West. 
 
It is coincidental, but perhaps providential, that Erdogan’s Davos performance 
would be followed so closely by Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s Feb. 12-15 
official state visit to Moscow, the first of its kind by a Turkish president.  Gul was 
enthusiastic at a joint press conference: “Our relations have already reached the 
level of [a] multidimensional positive partnership on a whole range of subjects. … 
Russia and Turkey are the two most important countries in the region, which are 
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called upon to make a weighty contribution to ensuring peace, stability, security 
and cooperation.” (7) 
 
President Medvedev’s commentary was similar, with an additional phrase: “And 
these are at the moment not simply relations between equals, but are also very 
friendly and have very good prospects. We have recently started to call them 
multifaceted cooperation and multidimensional partnership.” (8) 
 
“Not simply relations between equals.”  Whatever Medvedev meant to say, there 
is no disputing that right now, Turkey and Russia are not equal.  One need look 
no further than the countries’ respective trade volumes to see that.  During the 
state visit Medvedev pointed out that the Russia-Turkey trade volume has 
reached approximately $34 billion, (9) a giant leap from only $1 billion a decade 
ago; perhaps not wishing to embarrass his guest, Medvedev did not mention that 
this total disproportionately favors Russian exports to Turkey that reached 
approximately $28.26 billion in 2008. (10)  Speaking about the trade volume, Gul 
alluded only to “problems that exist in this area,” but then went on to express his 
hope that the volume will “very soon” reach $40 billion to $50 billion. (11) 
 
Any increase in trade volume will be due in part to Russia’s accelerating 
participation in the development of Turkey’s energy infrastructure.  During Gul’s 
visit, the two countries signed an agreement for Russia to supply Turkey with $60 
billion of electricity over the next 15 years. (12)  Additionally, Russia’s 
Atomstroyexport leads the only consortium to submit a bid to construct and 
operate Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, which would be located in the 
Mediterranean province of Mersin and have an operating capacity of 4,800 
megawatts. (13)  Possibly because it was the sole bidder, the consortium initially 
tendered an offer for the plant to produce electricity at the exorbitant price of 
21.16 cents per kilowatt hour, compared to the international average of 10 to 15 
cents per kilowatt hour. (14)  However, coinciding with Gul’s visit, Russian 
Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko announced, “We gave Turkey a good discount,” 
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which a representative of the Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Co. 
confirmed to be a 30% reduction to 15.35 cents per kilowatt hour. (15)  Shmatko 
also mentioned that Turkey may sign an agreement to have Russia construct 
four other nuclear plants of 1,200 megawatts each, and he estimated that the 
cost of the contract could be $18 billion to $20 billion. (16) 
 
Turkish money also has been flowing into Russia’s Muslim-majority Tatarstan 
region, where Turkey accounts for 70% of all foreign investment. (17)  The first 
Turkish president ever to visit the republic, Gul signed agreements for future 
Turkish investment worth $250 million. (18) 
 
While Gul’s visit seems unlikely to lead to any significant recalibration of the 
lopsided economic relationship between the two countries, they appear on more 
equal footing when it comes to regional diplomacy.  Gul and Medvedev signed a 
declaration in which Russia praised Turkey’s proposed Caucasus Stability and 
Cooperation Platform (CSCP) as a “constructive initiative which complements the 
existing international mechanisms and which will help eliminate the lack of trust 
between the countries involved in frozen conflicts.” (19) 
 
The significance of this statement is twofold.  First, Russia’s recognition of 
Turkey’s role vis-à-vis the CSCP seems to dismiss any lingering suggestions of ill 
will between the countries regarding Turkey’s behavior during the August, 2008 
Russian thrust into Georgia, as a direct result of which Turkey initially proposed 
the CSCP.  There had been reports that Russia was displeased that Turkey 
allowed US warships bearing humanitarian aid into the Black Sea during the 
conflict. (20)  Second, Russia is acknowledging Turkey’s diplomatic clout in 
relation to Ankara’s “frozen conflict” with Armenia, which has been thawing due 
to joint Turkish and Armenian efforts.  (21) 
 
In light of the good vibrations between Russia and Turkey, there seems to be 
only one thing that could put a crimp in the new relationship: Nabucco, the 
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proposed natural gas pipeline whose planners—a consortium comprising 
companies from Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Germany and Turkey, with 
possible Polish participation—envision gas flowing from Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan and Iran via Erzurum, Turkey, to Baumgarten, Austria.  In January, 
Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov dismissed Nabucco as “ill-
thought-out;” Gazprom’s CEO A. Alexander Medvedev claimed that Russia has 
"practically reserved the entire quantity" of Turkmenistan’s reserves, questioned 
whether Azerbaijan could provide its share of gas, and ruled out Iranian 
participation. (22) 
 
This abundance of criticism from Russia seems to betray resentment concerning, 
if not the pipeline itself, then at the negative publicity that accompanies most 
mentions of the as-yet-chimerical Nabucco.  In a January article in The 
Economist Nabucco was cited as a solution to the “real need … for Europe to 
reduce its [gas] dependence on Russia.” (23)  Bulgaria has announced that it 
would cancel 1 billion cubic meters of its annual Gazprom gas purchases in favor 
of Nabucco gas. (24) 
 
Turkey, however, is encouraging Russian participation in Nabucco.  Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ali Babacan acknowledged the veracity of A. Alexander 
Medvedev’s criticism, telling a Turkish news service, “If Russia feels itself 
excluded, it has instruments to hamper Nabucco. … First you have to provide the 
source and then find the consumer, and I think we need Russia to provide both of 
them.”  Babacan seems to concede that if Russia were to fight for its claims to 
Turkmenistan’s and Azerbaijan’s gas reserves, it could scupper Nabucco’s 
chances of operating at full capacity.  Turkey would have no problem with 
Russia’s eventual linking up to Nabucco, Babacan said, trying to dismiss the 
subtext of competition between the two countries. (25) 
 
So even this one potential sticking point for Russian-Turkish foreign relations 
also presents the possibility for Russia to gain greater access to the European 
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energy market.  Given that Nabucco’s capacity is projected to be able to satisfy 
at most 10% of Europe’s annual consumption of 300 billion cubic meters—
although this is a wildly optimistic estimate based on current consumption—
Russia has little reason to be worried. 
 
Indeed, currently Russia may hold a preferential hand regarding Turkey.  Global 
analysts predict that Nabucco will ease Turkey’s entry into the European Union, 
with Germany’s most recent Minister for Economics and Technology Michael 
Glos going so far as to refer to the pipeline as “political blackmail.” (26)  On the 
other side of the Atlantic, the United States will remain beholden to Turkey for the 
use of its Incirlik air base until the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.  Diplomatic 
relations between Turkey and Israel continue apace despite Erdogan’s diatribe 
concerning Gaza.  Rather than simply lying with the West, as David Phillips 
claims, Turkey may appear to have opportunities in all directions. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Shifting geopolitics prompt changes in Baku 
The Russian invasion of Georgia in August, coupled with Turkey’s recent 
overtures to Armenia, has prompted a subtle shift in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, 
most notably manifest in expanded cooperation with Iran.  
 
An explosion in early August on the Turkish portion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline combined with the fallout from the concurrent clash between 
Russia and Georgia cost Azerbaijan dearly. The US State Department estimates 
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that Azerbaijan lost over $1 billion in profits in August, due to lost oil from the 
explosion in Eastern Turkey and the cost of rerouting or halting other exports to 
avoid Russian strikes on the Georgian port of Poti. Faced with major losses, 
Azerbaijan offered the National Iranian Oil Terminals Company an oil swap (1) 
and also sought to ship gas via Russia. 
 
The economic losses inflicted by the August events are exacerbated by the 
prospect of a warming in the relationship of Azerbaijan’s close ally, Turkey, with 
its enemy, Armenia. In the years since war broke out between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Turkey has been a staunch 
supporter of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Ankara closed its border with 
Armenia and made its reopening contingent on resolution of the Karabakh 
conflict. That stipulation appears to have been lifted, however, following a visit by 
Turkish President Abdullah Gul to Yerevan in September during the UEFA World 
Cup qualifying match. The possibility of a Turkish-Armenian détente has given 
Azerbaijan the impetus to expand its regional relationships and gather supporters 
of its position on the Karabakh issue. 
 
Baku’s unease over the possibility of an unfavorable resolution to the Karabakh 
question is reflected in its defense spending. Azerbaijan steadily has increased 
its military capabilities over the last several years. Its fragile position in the event 
of a Turkish-Armenian agreement appears only to have encouraged this trend, 
with a 30 percent increase in its already high military spending budgeted for 
2009. (2) 
 
The shifting geopolitical situation in the region has resulted in increased 
cooperation between Baku and Tehran. Iranian leaders have expressed their 
support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, (3) and have offered to play a 
mediation role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, (4) although their support for 
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity makes Iranian mediation unacceptable from the 
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Armenian perspective. Iran is not part of the OSCE Minsk group charged with 
negotiating over Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
More important than moral support is the prospect of increased economic 
cooperation with Iran. The global economic downturn is affecting foreign 
investment flows in Azerbaijan. Although still reporting positive growth for 2008 
(2.6 percent), foreign investment in the energy sector fell 16.3 percent compared 
to 2007. (5) Though isolated in many ways from the global market, Iran 
represents a potentially valuable trading partner for Azerbaijan – all the more so 
because Tehran’s isolation offers Baku the possibility of heightened influence in 
a relatively restricted playing field. 
 
Increasingly, Baku has turned to Tehran as an outlet for its oil exports and as a 
trading partner. On 20 February, Iran and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of 
understanding that outlines 114 areas of economic cooperation. (6) Shortly 
thereafter, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev announced that he expected trade with 
Iran at least to double in the near future, (7) with Iranian Foreign Minister 
Manuchehr Mottaki estimating that bilateral trade could increase from $700 
million to $1.5 billion. (8) 
 
Not least among the areas of increased cooperation between Baku and Tehran is 
the energy sector. The oil shipments to Iran begun in the wake of the August war 
in Georgia have continued. Iran has expressed an interest in increasing its 
imports of Azeri gas. Iran first began paying commercial prices for Azeri gas in 
February 2008, and now pays roughly 2.5 times the price per barrel that Turkey 
does, making it an attractive customer. (9) Additionally, SOCAR, Azerbaijan’s 
state-owned oil company, and the National Iranian Oil Company (NICO) have 
announced that they will continue increasing their cooperation in the energy 
sector. (10) NICO intends to invest $1.7 billion and to hold a 10 percent interest 
in the second phase of exploration of Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas field. (11) The 
company already holds a ten percent stake in the project’s first phase. 
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With Turkey and Armenia on the path to cooperation and a precarious situation in 
Georgia, it is likely that Azerbaijan will continue pursuing a diverse foreign policy 
that seeks support from various regional actors as well as more distant players 
such as the United States and Europe. Azerbaijan’s regional outreach will include 
Russia, as well as Iran – the former for its potential influence on a Karabakh 
solution and the latter for economic benefits. The extent to which the Turkish 
relationship will be affected by an Armenian détente depends on developments in 
Ankara, Yerevan, Baku, and Stepanakert. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KRYGYZSTAN 
Is the Kyrgyz president ready to renegotiate Manas air base deal? 
Now that the Russian Duma has ratified the promised bail-out funds for 
Kyrgyzstan, is President Kurmanbek Bakiev ready to begin negotiating a new 
deal with the United States Air Force on the Manas air base?  And, perhaps 
more importantly, is Duma ratification as good as money in the bank? 
 
President Bakiev seems to think so, if the interview he gave to the BBC 
yesterday is any indication.  The Kyrgyz president told his interviewer that “the 
doors are not closed” regarding further talks on the US air base and that his 
administration is willing to consider new offers from the Pentagon: “We are ready 
for any new proposals from the US government aimed at stabilising the situation 
in Afghanistan.”  Bakiev further stated that new negotiations with the US would 
need to follow a different format and that should his government agree to another 
lease agreement, there would be changes in the conditions of use. (1)  
Kyrgyzstan’s leader has repeatedly cited US disregard for his requests for 
increased financial compensation as a major reason behind his decision to ask 
US troops to vacate the Manas base, but he now also seems to be hinting that a 
new lease agreement might require the Pentagon to adhere to stricter 
environmental standards and perhaps allow its soldiers to become more 
vulnerable to prosecution under Kyrgyzstan’s justice system.  Over the past few 
years, these last two points have been rallying cries for political factions lobbying 
 46 
for the base’s closure.  A shooting incident in December 2006 that resulted in the 
death of a civilian truck driver, Aleksandr Ivanov, who was making a fuel delivery 
to the base sparked widespread outrage and anti-US sentiment in the Kyrgyz 
media and resulted in a sharp uptick in the number of calls for the base to be 
shut down. (2)  The fact that Zachary Hatfield, the US serviceman who shot the 
truck driver, was immune from prosecution by Kyrgyz courts and did not remain 
in Kyrgyzstan until the investigation into Ivanov’s death was concluded, (3) 
fanned the flames of anti-US outrage even further. 
 
Immunity from prosecution by local courts for military personnel stationed abroad 
is the international standard and it seems highly unlikely that the US government 
would agree to alter that status for its servicemen and women, even if 
Kyrgyzstan’s justice system suddenly were to gain a reputation for transparency, 
fairness and impartiality, standards which Kyrgyz courts rarely seem to accord 
their own citizens.  However, the conduct of US troops while on Kyrgyz soil 
undoubtedly will need to be included in any future discussions of a continued US 
military presence at the Manas air base. 
 
Two additional and equally significant points raised by President Bakiev during 
his BBC interview touched on Kyrgyz involvement in resolving the conflict in 
Afghanistan and on Kyrgyzstan’s status at the negotiating table with more 
powerful countries, such as Russia and the United States.  The president told his 
interviewer: “We should be respected more…Our partners - be it the United 
States or Russia - should listen to what we have to say.”(4)  Bakiev is not the first 
Central Asian leader to feel frustration at the lack of respect shown by 
representatives from “great power” countries, such as Russia and the US, and if 
this dissatisfaction indeed did play a role in his decision to evict US troops from 
Manas, then the Pentagon may have much ground to make up in any future 
talks.  In a country renowned for its mastery of the arts of marketing and public 
relations, the US has made a poor showing in Central Asia overall and may have 
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missed numerous opportunities to improve relations significantly with the Central 
Asian governments as a result. 
 
One such opportunity currently on the table, is what role, if any, the Central Asian 
states should play in mediating the conflict in Afghanistan and/or in bringing 
greater stability to the region.  The threat posed by the continuing conflict in 
Afghanistan and its spillover effects come up for discussion virtually every time 
representatives of any of the former Soviet states get together, as well as 
occupying a place on the agenda of bilateral talks with officials from both the 
regional or “great power” states.  Those Central Asian states that share a 
sizeable stretch of border with Afghanistan are particularly vulnerable to the 
narcotics and weapons’ trafficking, which Kabul seems unable to quell and which 
has resulted in spillovers of violence onto Central Asian territory on more than 
once occasion.  The Kyrgyz government has expressed concern about this 
situation numerous times and in numerous venues and in his recent BBC 
interview, President Bakiev brought it up once again, this time offering his 
country as a neutral setting for UN-sponsored peace talks between President 
Karzai and Taleban leaders. (5)  Bakiev’s offer is a clear, unequivocal signal to 
the US, NATO, and Russia that one of his top priorities is to create greater 
stability and security in Afghanistan and that a secure, stable Afghanistan is of 
equal, if not greater, importance for his country than placating American, NATO, 
or Russian interests. 
 
Kyrgyzstan all too often is viewed primarily as a pawn being pushed and pulled 
between Russia and the US, and government officials from those countries 
frequently appear to extend economic or other benefits to Bishkek mainly in order 
to attain other goals, such use of an air base (the Russian military uses the Kant 
air base), support for certain international initiatives, control over energy assets, 
etc.  However, representatives from the “great power” states should not forget 
that President Bakiev’s administration has its own interests to protect and 
although Bakiev may have fewer resources and less muscle at his disposal than 
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either the Russian or US leaders, he may yet possess enough bargaining power 
to embolden him to pursue his own agenda, such as a role for his government in 
the stabilization and development of Afghanistan. 
 
Having obtained a Russian bail-out for his own administration and for his 
country’s hydro-power industry, Bakiev now seems to feel confident enough to 
turn his attention to international issues, such as the US air base and the conflict 
in Afghanistan.  The Kyrgyz government’s actions regarding the closure of the 
US air base closely followed the Russian government’s actions regarding the 
promised debt write-off and bail-out funds.  Now that the Duma has ratified the 
various parts of the agreement (6) and the Russian government has amended 
federal budget items for 2009-2011 to include the loan amounts promised to 
Bishkek, (7) and Bakiev, in turn, has fulfilled his part of the bargain by completing 
the process for evicting US troops from Manas, the Kyrgyz president appears 
ready to discuss a new deal on the air base, this time to include a longer list of 
demands, as well as greater restrictions on US troop activities. 
 
Were the Pentagon to allow at least a discussion of how Kyrgyzstan could 
become involved in mitigating the situation in Afghanistan as part of future 
negotiations on re-opening Manas to the US, it might go a long way toward 
convincing President Bakiev that his concerns regarding Afghanistan are being 
taken seriously, as well as assuring him that even though his country does not 
wield the international clout of Russia or the US, his status at the negotiating 
table is viewed with equal respect. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Kyrgyz U-turn on US base mooted,” 4 Mar 09, BBC News, Asia Pacific via 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7923702.stm>, last accessed 4 Mar 09. 
(2) “U.S. military spokesman says Kyrgyzstan shooting appears to come under 
immunity agreement,” 8 Dec 06, The Times of Central Asia via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
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(3) Alexander Cooley, “Kyrgyzstan: The Five Lessons of the Great American Air 
Base Debate,” 12 Feb 09, Eurasia Insight, EURASIANET.ORG via 
<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav021209.shtml>, last 
accessed 5 Mar 09. 
(4) “Kyrgyz U-turn on US base mooted,” 4 Mar 09, BBC News, Ibid. 
(5) Ibid.  
(6) “Russia's upper house approves loans to Kyrgyzstan,” 20 Feb 09, Prime-Tass 
Business News Agency via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) “Russia amends budget to sanction $2bn gov't loan to Kyrgyzstan,” 3 Mar 09, 
RosBusinessConsulting Database via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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UKRAINE 
Return to Kuchma-land? 
During the regime of President Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s security services 
(SBU) regularly were used to threaten and intimidate members of the political 
opposition, civic leaders, and the media. 
 
Over the last year, there have been increasing signs that the office of the 
president has returned to using the SBU—in conjunction with the Prosecutor-
General’s Office—for political purposes. These signs have included “escorting” 
politicians critical of President Yushchenko to the Prosecutor’s office for lengthy 
questioning on dubious grounds and visits to politicians and state officials by 
SBU representatives.  Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, Interior Minister Yuriy 
Lutsenko and MP David Zhvania, all of whom have been publicly critical of the 
president, were questioned for hours in relation to criminal cases that did not 
move forward and never were explained fully. 
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On 4 March, the apparent political use of the SBU by the Yushchenko 
administration reached new heights.  On that day, at least a dozen masked, 
heavily armed men burst into the headquarters of Ukraine’s gas monopoly 
Naftohaz.  According to witness statements carried on the Ukrayinska Pravda 
website, the men leaped over turnstiles and barriers to rush into the heart of the 
building, showing no identification and no documentation.  Holding automatic 
weapons, they blocked off hallways and demanded to be shown copies of the 19 
January gas contract between Naftohaz and Gazprom. (1)  In fact, in press 
statements, an SBU spokesperson claimed that the search for this contract was 
the reason for the raid. (2) 
 
This claim raised eyebrows, since the contract has appeared on numerous 
websites.  In fact, it is one of the most widely published contracts of any 
agreement with Gazprom.  Moreover, thanks to archaic, Soviet-era regulations, 
Naftohaz must show the original contract (with the accompanying myriad of 
signatures and stamps) to the customs service in order to clear Russian gas 
through Ukraine for both domestic and international use. Without the original 
contract, the customs service, which is under the precarious control of President 
Yushchenko, could refuse to allow Russian gas into the country. 
 
An SBU spokesman later accused Naftohaz of illegally appropriating 900 million 
dollars of gas. (3)  This statement is widely believed to refer to 11 billion cubic 
meters of gas that had belonged to private gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo.  The 
spokesman did not say why the state-run SBU would raid another state-run 
company looking for documents related to a dispute with a privately-held 
company in which the state has no interest.  In essence, the SBU chose to work 
on behalf of RosUkrEnergo against Naftohaz. 
 
Although accounts of the raid come from perhaps biased Naftohaz employees, 
photos and videos provided by various media show heavily armed men in SWAT-
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like gear surrounding employees, fighting with parliamentary deputies who had 
arrived to defend Naftohaz employees, and going through piles of documents. (4) 
 
Within several hours of the raid, the attorney for Prime Minister Tymoshenko’s 
political bloc had secured a court order confirming that state services require a 
warrant to conduct such a search.  The court instructed the SBU to produce such 
a warrant, prove probable cause or leave.  Faced with furious deputies, nervous 
employees (one of whom was rushed to the hospital, fearing a heart attack) and 
a swarm of media, the SBU left – without the contract. 
 
On Thursday, 5 March, the SBU attempted to gain entrance to Naftohaz 
subsidiary UkrTransGaz (although this entity presumably does not possess the 
desired contract), but officials, private security employees, and parliamentary 
deputies demanded warrants and court orders legalizing the search.  The SBU 
left. (5) 
 
The situation sounds so confusing and, actually, ridiculous, that it is easy to miss 
the main moral of this saga. 
 
The SBU raids came a day after Ukraine’s currency had rebounded somewhat 
against the dollar, a day after the government amended the budget to meet the 
concerns of international organizations, a few days after the IMF had said it was 
pleased with the country’s progress toward earning the second tranche of its 
$16.4 billion loan, and at a time when Naftohaz and Gazprom seemed to have an 
understanding about payment schedules.  During a period of consistently bad 
economic news and political infighting, for the first time in a long time, the 
government seemed to be making just a bit of progress. 
 
In contrast to these precarious achievements, this raid paints a picture of chaos, 
infighting, corruption, and incompetence.  Prime Minister Tymoshenko charges 
that this is exactly what the President and his allies want.  In fact, several 
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sources close to the Ukrainian government and gas industry told TIA yesterday 
that they suspect (although they have no evidence) that this raid was designed to 
undermine Ukraine’s credibility internationally, in order to damage Yushchenko’s 
chief rival in the upcoming presidential elections – Tymoshenko.   Since 
Ukraine’s reputation as a gas transit country is key to its international standing, 
attacking the heart of its gas industry would be the best way to impact 
international opinion. 
 
There may be a much more practical reason for the raid, however.  Numerous 
Ukrainian media have charged that President Yushchenko is allied with Dmytro 
Firtash, who owns 45% of RosUkrEnergo (RUE).  Russia’s Gazprom owns 50% 
of the company.   The 19 January contract removes RUE as the intermediary 
between Gazprom and Naftohaz – a decision that could mean a loss of income 
of up to $800 million per year.  A separate agreement on 19 January, confirmed 
by both Gazprom and Naftohaz, allowed Ukraine to purchase 11 billion cubic 
meters of gas held in storage in Ukraine by RUE.  The gas is to be used to power 
Ukraine’s pumping stations, in order to send gas to Europe. 
 
Because it is to be used to transit gas, Prime Ministers Putin and Tymoshenko 
agreed that Ukraine would pay a hugely discounted price of $153/tcm for this 
gas, as opposed to the average price of $228/tcm the country will pay for other 
gas. 
 
Firtash, who has gas interests throughout Eastern Europe, objected to the 
transfer of ownership of the gas and said he would sue in Stockholm for its 
return, as allowed by his contract with Ukraine.  For reasons known only to 
himself, Yushchenko immediately sided with Firtash and questioned why 
Ukraine—the country where he is president—should be able to purchase this 
gas. 
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At a National Security and Defense Council meeting chaired by Yushchenko, 
members reportedly voted to begin investigating the circumstances behind the 
purchase of this gas.  
 
Tymoshenko responded that the country had received a very good deal, and that 
Ukraine could not afford to pay more for the fuel it uses to transit gas to Europe.  
The $153/tcm price was available only on the gas already in storage in Ukraine.  
Any other gas would cost $228/tcm.  Still, Yushchenko questioned the purchase. 
 
For its part, the parliament voted on 5 March to investigate the SBU’s 
investigation.  At the same time, Russia confirmed that the “auditing chambers” 
of both countries are investigating RUE’s activities.  And Naftohaz paid its 
February gas bill on time and in full. 
 
There is no indication, meanwhile, if this latest episode will derail discussions 
with the IMF for the continuation of Ukraine’s loan agreement.  If the IMF 
becomes spooked by these developments and does not provide funding, Ukraine 
faces the prospect of a total economic collapse.  So far, Yushchenko has made 
no comment on this possibility. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “SBU zakhopilo Naftohaz. Khronika podiy (SBU Took Naftohaz: Chronicle of 
Events),” Ukrayinska Pravda, 4 Mar 09 via 
http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/49ae68058eb6f/. 
(2) “Ukraine's Gas Company Raided; Two Leaders Clash on Reason for Probe,” 
Washington Post Foreign Service, 5 Mar 09. 
(3) Ibid.  
(4) See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHTIoEiJKEc for raw video. 
(5) “SBU v “Ukrtransgaze” nichego ne dobilis’ i ushli (At UkrTransGaz, the SBU 
obtained nothing and left),” Ukrayinska Pravda, 5 Mar 09 via 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/ru/news/2009/3/5/89349.htm. 
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